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experts are questioning the wisdom of basement fallout shelters. The net result, they caution, "might be to trap families far removed from the target area in the flaming wreckage of their homes."

Don't build a shelter. If you feel like doing something about it, Bertrand Russell is a better guide than your smiling neighborhood shelter contractor, or even your Congressman.

Hypnosis in Government

Allen Welsh Dulles has been succeeded as director of the Central Intelligence Agency by another well-heeled and self-confident gentleman, John A. McCone. The transfer of power took place under curious auspices. The President met the outgoing and incoming directors at the Naval War College before an audience of Naval officers and personnel and laid on praise and congratulations with a trowel; then Dulles lauded McCone, and McCone lauded Dulles. The inference was that McCone intended to follow in Dulles' footsteps. One would have thought that Dulles' career in the CIA had been a long, splendid climb from success to success, that there had never been a U-2 "incident" nor a Cuban fiasco. It was a triumph of good manners over the facts of life. An alternative explanation is that Dulles is a hypnotist, somewhat like J. Edgar Hoover, and can make even Presidents say whatever he wants them to say.

On the day when America's vast spy organization was introduced to its new boss, there appeared in the *Congressional Record* a speech by Representative Daddario of Connecticut on the CIA. Daddario is no novice in the field of intelligence; he served in the Office of Strategic Services under William J. Donovan in World War II and, among other decorations, received the U.S. Legion of Merit and the Italian *Medaglia d'Argento*. The speech was a model of methodical analysis of intelligence services in general and the CIA in particular. It proposed the formation of a Joint Committee on the Intelligence Community to supervise all intelligence agencies, including the CIA, and introduced a concurrent resolution to that effect.

One would think that the press would have tied in the Daddario speech, so full of information and illumination, with the McCone appointment, almost as a matter of course. Nothing of the kind happened. Dulles and McCone got all the publicity, Daddario received no attention at all. His speech was long; perhaps that accounts for it. Newspaper editors, much less TV and radio commentators, have no time for such discourses, no matter how much in the public interest.

The moral seems to be that an agency can survive any number of failures, if only they are big enough, and if the agency itself is sufficiently hypertrophied. The CIA particularly has been a government within the government. It has overlapped or taken over the

functions of other departments, and sometimes forced them to act contrary to their own evaluations and judgment. "... In the absence of surveillance by Congress," says Mr. Daddario, "it [the CIA] has become a rather sprawling organization." What understatement! It is no secret that many officials of the State Department have long felt that Dulles' CIA had its own diplomatic service and did its best to make foreign policy. And often succeeded, as when it overthrew the Mossadegh government in Iran, the Arbenz government in Guatemala, and Souvanna Phouma in Laos.

The prospects are that under McCone the CIA will not be compelled to mend its ways. It may even, in accordance with Parkinson's law, expand its personnel beyond the presently estimated total of 10,000, and further increase the traffic jam at its splendid new headquarters (the "little Pentagon") at Langley, Va. As for the separation of its intelligence and "operational" functions — the Cuban fiasco was an example of the latter — by all indications it will be in name only. According to Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott (*Los Angeles Times*, September 26), the President will shortly announce the separation, but the two functions will still remain within the CIA! Presumably, to implement this decision, Mr. McCone will be equipped by the CIA's own psychiatrists with a dual personality.

The Penalties of Virtue

If Allen W. Dulles has been rewarded for what might be called destructive creativity, J. W. Fulbright can expect only to be denigrated for his public service, and indeed that is happening. The ax is out for Fulbright, and he will be fortunate to hold his seat in the Senate.

In the eyes of the far Right, everything is wrong with Fulbright. First, he is an intellectual in the sense that he thinks, and thinks in terms of facts, not clichés, and in terms of the country's welfare, not political expediency. Second, as one reporter in Washington said, Fulbright is "intellectually unterrified"; he has courage as well as wisdom. Third, he does not believe in tutelage by the military. Fourth, he is an internationalist in that he believes the United States must pay attention to world opinion. Fifth, he doubts that it is possible for any nation, even his own, to be 100 per cent right 100 per cent of the time. Thus he has said, according to the Associated Press, that Berlin was not all the fault of the Russians. "The Americans contributed much to this. . . . I do not want to be self-righteous about it." There is some doubt as to the accuracy of the quotation, but its import is unmistakable. Here is a man who, in a matter affecting the interest or supposed interest of his country, is unwilling to be self-righteous. A personality so constituted does not go down well with the John Birch and Barry Goldwater crowds.

Marguerite Higgins, the piquant and vivacious col-

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unist of the New York *Herald Tribune*, takes Mr. Fulbright to task on account of his statement about Berlin. It tends, she says, "to diminish the degree of right on our side and therefore contributes, however unwittingly, to the demoralizing question: is the situation in Berlin really worth defending?" A "double psychological whammy," Miss Higgins concludes. And he has done it before, she asserts: in Laos, for instance.

The fact is that if Fulbright had been listened to for the past eight years the United States would not be the frustrated and insecure country it is. The basic trouble with Fulbright is that he is right in advance of the event, not after it, and this does not please the demagogues who thrive on trouble and rancor. Fulbright warned Eisenhower against the interference in Laos which has put our whole position in Southeast Asia in jeopardy. He warned Kennedy about Cuba. He has insisted that we stand by our own values. On the great issue of war or peace, he consistently exhibits the qualities of the founders of the United States and applies them to instant situations. He deserves no mercy, and from the orators of the Right, he will most certainly not get any.

Syria: Revolt at the Top

The Egyptian economy which Nasser inherited from the Farouk regime embodied the worst aspects of a capitalist system plus the colonial legacy of deliberately fostered economic dependency. Eighteen million *fellahin* drew their support from an arable land base of one-third acre per capita of agricultural population. Commerce, industry, public services and banking were largely in the hands of foreigners and recent emigrants from the eastern Mediterranean, whose only local loyalty was their bankroll. It was against such a background that socialism came to be viewed as the answer to accelerated growth, a more equitable income distribution and infernal generation of capital requirements.

This process began to take systematic form in 1956 and saw a speed-up after the union with Syria in February, 1958. The question arose as to whether measures drastically needed in Egypt should be applied uniformly to Syria with its relatively richer resources, greater prosperity and an indigenous and energetic entrepreneurial class.

Last spring the decision to assume a truly massive rôle in the economy of both regions was made. It was believed that economic planning would be impossible otherwise, and that there would be a serious morale problem should Egyptians be treated more strictly than their fellow Syrian citizens. In July came the Presidential decree which nationalized all banks, insurance companies and specified companies and organizations of a "national character"; stipulated government control of a majority share in ninety-one other major companies;

limited individual capital participation to a maximum of \$25,000; required 25 per cent of the profits of all companies to go to workers in the form of bonuses and social services; limited remuneration for company executives and established a steeper progressive income tax. Among the industries nationalized was the *Khomasiyat*, the Syrian Mitsubishi, with which some of the present revolt's leaders were associated.

These decrees shook the Syrian elite profoundly but they could do little so long as the Syrian, Lieut. Col. Serraj, remained as Big Brother. But Serraj soon found himself shoved upstairs with a nominal vice presidency, also with residence in Cairo. A power vacuum was created and the al-Kuzbari group saw their chance. They capitalized on many resentments but, as a conservative force of the older order, embodied only some of them. This augurs ill for the stability of the present regime.

It is now clear that Nasser promulgated the July decrees for Syria before he was politically strong enough to implement them. He might have prevailed had he not insisted on staffing the upper echelons of the military and administrative corps with Egyptians, to the irritation of Syrians. Perhaps he would have failed regardless. Common language, religion and historical experience are deceptively superficial institutions on which to build a unified nation.

In all likelihood, Arab nationalists will now split into two groups — those who favor the gradualist approach to Arab unity through evolving economic and political suprastructures and those who stand adamant in advocating forcible union at one sweep through the overthrow of dissenting governments. (Hitherto an Arab nationalist was defined by the latter standard.) This would be another — and perhaps the most serious — division of an Arab world already splintered by personal and group rivalries.

HUAC's Timing

On September 23-24, a "rally" was held at the St. Nicholas Arena in New York to urge a reversal of the Supreme Court's decision of last June to compel members of the Communist Party and its "fronts" to register under the Internal Security Act. About 1,200 persons attended. No one who read the line-up and the name, "National Assembly for Democratic Rights," and followed the proceedings, could have had much doubt that the Communist Party had had a hand, and probably a directing hand, in the organization of this assembly. *The Nation*, however, is not among those who are prepared to damn it on that account. *The Nation* is of course interested in who is behind a cause, but it is even more interested in what is said and done and, above all, in whether the sayings and doings comport with the Constitution of the United States.

The "National Assembly for Democratic Rights" did